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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that a philosophy of life can provide a new conception of the good which 
can provide a useful framework for the resolution of political and ethical disputes. Building off 
Nietzsche, Spinoza, Bergson, Foucault and Deleuze, it outlines what is central to life 
philosophy and how these thinkers can be represented as providing a new basis for 
normative political philosophy which avoids both mechanistic atomism and teleological 
organicism. It goes on to explain how such an approach was developed by economists such 
as J.A. Hobson in the welfare state liberal tradition in the early twentieth century and how life 
philosophy can be utilised to support a revised welfare liberalism today, re-establishing 
a revised post-Keynesianism as the basis of a global institutionalism for the twenty-first 
century. 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper argues that a philosophy of life can provide a new conception of the good which 
can provide a useful framework for the resolution of political and ethical disputes. Building 
off Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson, Foucault and Deleuze, it outlines what is central to 
life philosophy and how these thinkers can be represented as providing a new basis for 
normative political philosophy which avoids both mechanistic atomism and teleological 
organicism. It goes on to explain how such an approach was developed by philosophers such 
as Friedrich Nietzsche and how life philosophy can function to steer evaluations which are 
genuinely cross-cultural, thus avoiding both moral and epistemological relativism in relation 
to the assessment of other cultures. 
 
 
The history of Lebensphilosophie 
 
Herbert Schnädelbach (1984) has identified three forms of life philosophy. The first form is 
what he refers to as metaphysical life philosophy which posits a conception of life as an 
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objective noumenal substance beyond (or underneath) the domains of human perception and 
consciousness. Schnädelbach gives the example of Henri Bergson’s élan vital to illustrate. 
For Bergson élan vital refers to an inanimate ahistorical principle or substance beyond the 
realm of the human experience which could ultimately only be verified through ‘intuition’ or 
direct apprehension. In this conception life represents a permanent universal substrate which 
lies behind and explains human and non-human experience. It relies upon a fundamental 
dualism between the conceptual experience and the supposition of something beyond the 
realm of experience which is ahistorical. Life philosophy in this sense is something which 
functions as a permanent animating principle or basic metaphysical force. 
 
Snädelbach’s second form refers to life philosophy as a philosophy of history.  This form of 
life philosophy is represented by historians such as Oswald Spengler who theorizes the rise 
and fall of historical cultures as forms of growth and decay, where historical cultures are 
treated as parallel to organisms, and where history involves a process of struggle equivalent 
to the struggle depicted by Darwin between species and life forms within history.  Societies 
in this model are depicted metaphorically as life forms like species, or vegetation, which 
unfold, decay, burst forth, and develop. As Alastair Morgan (2007: 9)2 notes, such a 
perspective “collapses any distinction between culture and nature in a fateful identification of 
the processes of life with those of a politics that emphasizes growth, vigour and the healthy.  
The move from such a philosophy to the concepts of race and Social Darwinism intrinsic to 
National Socialist ideology is obvious.”   
 
 
Snädelbach’s third form of life philosophy is ethical life philosophy which he identifies with 
Friedrich Nietzsche. This form distinguishes between what is living and what does not live 
and identifies a normativity immanent in life itself.  What enhances and sustains life in this 
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sense grounds a conception of value and becomes the basis for establishing all value.  As 
Morgan (2007: 9) puts it, it “becomes the grounding for all values and norms.”  It is primarily 
this conception that is the subject of focus in this chapter. Although my focus will be derived 
from a wide variety of thinkers, including Spinoza, Hume, Heidegger, Bataille, Deleuze, and 
Foucault, it is Nietzsche who is the central inspiration.  For Nietzsche, as reason and ideology 
coalesce, the only basis for sound evaluations is related to that which supports or does not 
support life.  This is why he recognizes authentic existence as that which seeks to sustain and 
enhance; concerned, as Ansell-Pearson (1994: 18) says, with “abundant health and strength.”  
It is why Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil (1966: Sect. 4): “The falseness of a 
judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to the judgement….The question is to what 
extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species preserving, perhaps even species breeding; 
and our fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest judgements… are the most 
indispensable to us…”  If things are valued for the sake of life, Nietzsche defines life as “a 
multiplicity of forces connected by a common mode of nutrition” (1968: Sect. 641) in which 
“the different contenders grow unequally” (Sect. 642). As Lester Hunt (1991: 126) puts it, 
“Life is a hierachically integrated system the members of which have a common means of 
support. Perfection is the state in which this integration is fully achieved  (volkommen). To 
‘enhance life,’ then, is to increase the extent to which this state has been achieved.” 
  
Bataille also identifies the theme of a concern with life as pervading Nietzsche’s thought, 
most prominently expressed in his concept of the Overman and Nietzsche’s concern with the 
future, as expressed forcefully in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, and notes 
and commentaries that eventually constituted The Will to Power. For Bataille, Nietzsche’s 
philosophy represents a concern with life that represents a specifically non-moral yearning 
once God is Dead, a goal that stretches out before one, as Bataille (2004: xviii) puts it 
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“independently of moral goals or of serving God,” and yet paradoxically itself becomes 
articulated as a moral obligation, imposing an object that “surpasses all others in value” (xvii) 
and translating “as a demand for definite acts” (xvii). This concern with life’s continuance in 
Nietzsche is not substantive or developmental, as in Hegel, but expresses a relationship to the 
environment manifesting both a historicity and consequent contingency in terms of how that 
relationship is traversed. It is the concern with life’s continuance that Zarathustra teaches. It 
is the bridge that Zarathustra seeks to cross, the new dawn, midday, noontide, and beyond.  
 
 
The quest for life’s continuance need not be seen as coming from an essential cause in human 
nature. Nietzsche rejects the idea of conatus as an instinct for self-preservation. It is not 
through an instinct or drive to self-preservation that survival primarily ensues. As we have 
seen above, there must be something ‘more’ than self-preservation. For Nietzsche, too, life 
and survival are responsive to the effect of will (as opposed to an instinct).  This is also 
evident in his criticisms of Darwinian evolution theory, which he saw as deficient in this key 
respect. As Elizabeth Grosz (2004) says, Nietzsche dissented from Darwin’s view of natural 
selection, asserting a thesis of survival plus excess as the aim of development. This was the 
idea of a higher order than that to which Darwin subscribed. Centrally where Nietzsche 
differed from Darwin, says Grosz, is that:  
 
Nietzsche wants to bring forth from Darwin’s own heritage an activity that Darwin 
did not recognize adequately: the active force of seizing hold of a thing, of matter. 
Life is not a reaction to matter or nature, but a seizing of matter and a rendering it 
for one’s own purposes to come. Life is not simply a subjective interpretation 
imposed on matter that leaves matter absolutely intact and untouched; interpretation 
is itself the activity of making matter over, overcoming its form by one’s own 
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forces, the wills to power that compete to make life more than itself. Nietzsche 
understands clearly that evolution is overcoming, and that evolution is thus a 
process that, if it occurs at all, occurs equally for ideas, customs, and social 
practices as much as it does for organs, morphologies, and instincts (107).   
 
Nietzsche thus differs from Darwin in that life is not simply about survival, but about excess 
or abundance. Darwin is too preoccupied, for Nietzsche, with the struggle for existence, and 
the mere avoidance of death.  
 
Life: zoe and bios 
 
If Nietzsche serves as a general inspiration in creating a normative philosophy of life, what 
other writers are important, and what elements should we include.  We can start by saying 
that life constitutes itself as both strategy and telos. It is orientated to the future, or as I will 
say more often, life seeks to continue. To represent it in terms of continuance is to represent 
it in terms of survival and well-being. Continuance is thus intended only as a short-hand 
descriptor to represent these dimensions of life. It is life that is the important concept, but life 
must be understood as a force which seeks to continue on the basis of a will. For Agamben 
(1999: 239) “‘life’ is not a medical and scientific notion but a philosophical, political, and 
theological concept.” For Foucault (1998: 476), following Georges Canguilhem, “life…is 
that which is capable of error.”3 It is this fact, he continues, that “life has led to a living being 
that is never completely in the right place, that is destined to ‘err’ and to be ‘wrong.’” Indeed, 
“if one grants that the concept [of error] is the reply that life itself has given to that chance 
process, one must agree that error is the root of what produces human thought and its history” 
(476). 
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As Georges Bataille (1985: 171) notes, “men act in order to be.” Such action is central to the 
idea of life. At the strategic level, it requires continuance and maintenance of being; but 
more, it involves a striving for well-being. Rather than view such a striving naturalistically, it 
should be represented as the effect of a will. I would maintain that the quest for being is 
always the quest for well-being. Life is regarded as inherently normative in this sense that it 
strives for continuance and the maintenance of well-being. It represents what the Greeks 
called zoē, which refers to simple living, what referred to for Aristotle “mere living” (see 
Aristotle’s Politics: 1278b), as opposed to bios, which pertained to the historical or cultural 
form of living of a group or polis, and was represented as the good life. Yet, Aristotle thought 
that some normative principle possibly resided in zoē. As he says in the Politics:  
 
And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another’s help, desire to live 
together all the same, and are in fact brought together by their common interests in 
proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly 
the chief end, both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life (in 
which there is possibly some noble element) mankind meet together and maintain 
the political community, so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance 
the good (1905: 1278b) 
  
Despite his view that some noble element comprises bare life, Aristotle is usually interpreted 
as presupposing a distinction between natural (or animal existence) and social and political 
life. For Foucault, on the other hand, the political is seen as simply extending out of, or 
sitting on top of, bare life, as necessary to it. Thus, in the last chapter of the History of 
Sexuality, Volume One, Foucault states: “For millennia, man remained what he was for 
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Aristotle: a living animal with an additional capacity for political existence; modern man is 
an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being into question” (1978: 143)  
  
Foucault’s central thesis is a temporal one. Shifts in form occur at particular times in history. 
At a certain level of complexity, both coordination and justice become indispensable. 
Aristotle was wrong to discern distinct ontic states of zoē and bios: zoē exists within bios, but 
is distinct from it. Life is always political, for politics expresses nothing but the relations 
between life that mediate the one and the many.  
  
Although Foucault sees a continuity between bare life and political life, it is Agamben’s 
(1998) so-called ‘correction’ or ‘completion’ in Homo Sacer to reinsert the non-identity 
between bare life and political life in terms of which political life fails continually to be able 
to reconcile the relationship with bare life itself. Although one nestles within the other, 
politics must repeatedly seek a synthesis of relations between men’s bare existence and the 
good of all; to the extent it fails, the result is violence or death.  
  
Although Foucault never utilized the concept of life in a normative sense, there is a possible 
way forward on this basis. Mere life does not just ‘possibly’ contain a ‘noble element’, but 
always contains at least some sort of normative element, in that life must, if it is to remain as 
life, seek its own continuance and well-being. This at least is a possible extension, and one 
that possibly makes sense of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. A similar claim could be extended to 
Georges Canguilhem, for whom the norm of medicine maintained its existence because of 
the normativity in life itself. In his book, On The Normal and the Pathalogical, Canguilhem 
(1978: 73) argues that “it is life itself and not medical judgment which makes the biological 
normal a concept of value and not a concept of statistical reality.” Such a program to achieve 
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well-being requires definite acts. It can thus (I will argue) function as a support for a moral 
and political theory. The shift from zoē to bios is in this view simply a function of 
complexity. Such ‘mere living’ is thus not primarily natural, but is always a form of living, 
and hence, exists within bios. If mere life is always a historical form of life and contains its 
own normative principle for continuance and well-being, the distinction between zoē and bios 
is one of scale, or complexity. This incorporates that the distinction can usefully mediate 
between the individual and collective, or between the social and the political. Hence, the 
sense that Plato has Socrates say, in the Crito (section 48b), that “the really important thing is 
not to live but to live well” doesn’t conflict with such a view and doesn’t necessarily imply a 
dualism of nature/culture.4 This will give rise to various theses. Politics entails a relation 
between zoē and bios that must be managed. It need not require that we posit a theory of 
nature. In an overcrowded global world, the achievement of continuance and well-being for 
any—I will argue—will necessitate complex collective political and institutional structures 
for all. In Heidegger’s sense (1993: 326), an “enframing” [Ge-stell] will be required that 
“entraps nature,” and reduces the world to a “calculable coherence of forces.”  
  
Within Foucault’s writings on life, as Peter Fitzpatrick (2005: 57) points out, there is a 
certain “vitalist excess,” in that Foucault, as we will see further below, does not foreclose the 
possibilities of resolving the problems of war and catastrophe or arbitrary violence in the way 
Agamben does, in the way he privileges sovereignty, following Schmitt (1985), based on the 
ability to define the state of exception as an invariant historical form. Haart and Negri (2000) 
reject the dominance of life by an all-powerful conception of sovereignty in Agamben in 
support of Foucault’s more historically open and optimistic thesis. Foucault believes it 
possible to find “a way of living in complete mobility and not of immobilizing life” (1980b: 
60). Through his notions such as ‘resistance’, life is able to contain and democratize 
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sovereignty. In such a view, Foucault asserts the theoretical openness of his historicism and 
his similarity to Deleuze on the issue of life. It supports an adherence to a critical vitalism of 
the sort associated with Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Bergson, in the shift in the nineteenth 
century from a “matter-based physics to an energy-based model” (Marks, 1998: 67).5 Also, to 
a conception of immanence in the sense utilized by Deleuze and Guattari, for whom 
immanence means ‘openness’ in relation to complexity management or chaos and without 
transcendent values. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 35–8), and Deleuze by himself (1997: 
4) have stated, immanence describes the ‘movement of the infinite’; it is equivalent to 
‘chaos’; ‘formless, unlimited, absolute’, it ‘escapes every transcendence’. Life is an 
immanent force that permits infinite ways to continue. Although these may invoke universals 
(such as the requirement for sustenance, for example), such universals are always 
contingently realized and therefore always have a (potentially) variable contingent dimension 
or aspect. In this sense, as for Hegel, the universal is in the particular. Immanence, say 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 45), is ‘never to Something’, such as sovereignty, for if it is ‘to 
Something’ it fixes it as a historical constant. Peter Fitzpatrick (2005: 64) has used such a 
view to underscore the differences between Agamben and his ahistorical prioritizing of 
sovereignty on the one hand, and Foucault and Deleuze’s more historically open perspective 
on the other. According to Fitzpatrick, in Foucault, the theme of “an excess of life over death 
[exists] in [his] combining sovereignty and biopower,” whereas in Agamben the “death-
driven reign of sovereignty is unavoidable” (68). 
  
If the term ‘survival’ is sometimes used to designate the strategic aspect of life as the striving 
for continuance and well-being, it does not equate to ‘bare survival’, or ‘minimum bare 
subsistence’, or ‘bare humanness’, but indicates a strategy that is common to all of life—to 
animals, humans, and gods, as was ‘mere’ or ‘simple’ life for Aristotle. More carefully 
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stated, this strategy is one concerned with either ‘conservation’ or ‘growth’. It is 
characterized, as Bataille (1991: 23) says, not just with struggle and conservation of energy, 
or struggle to avoid death, but with ‘excess’ and superabundance, for “[on] the surface of the 
globe, for living matter in general, energy is always in excess; the question is always posed in 
terms of extravagance.” If the organism always “has at its disposal greater energy resources 
than are necessary for the operations that sustain life” it means that the term survival does not 
fully convey what is implied by life. For, as Elizabeth Grosz (2004: 103) says, the mere 
“struggle for existence aims too low: it aims only for existence, for bare survival, for mere 
life itself….[T]his struggle for self-preservation, for survival, is by definition a losing fight. If 
survival is the goal of life, life fails in every case!” Thus the conception of life is always 
something more than mere survival or existence, for it must be conceived as an active force 
by which an organism achieves continuance and maintains (well)being. Hence, it cannot 
mean what it did for Darwin, as mere adaptation, accommodation, or passive reaction to 
external forces.  
  
If life operates through energy, or power, the limits of its excess are ultimately determined by 
life in a particular relationship to space. As Bataille (1991: 29) says, “the immediate 
limitation, for each individual or each group, is given by the other individuals or other 
groups. But the terrestrial sphere (to be exact, the biosphere), which corresponds to the space 
available to life, is the only real limit.” Space, and other life, for Bataille, constitutes the 
“local conditions [which] determine the intensity of the pressure exerted in all directions by 
life.” Such pressures determine the limits of growth and the prospect of death. While it is 
difficult to define them, one can adduce their effects. One effect is shear quantitative 
extension of occupation of space as life continues; another effect is poverty or luxury. 
Bataille continues: “Beside the external action of life (climatic or volcanic phenomena), the 
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unevenness of pressure in living matter continually makes available to growth the place left 
vacant by death. It is not a new space, and if one considers life as a whole, there is not really 
growth but a maintenance of volume in general” (1991: 33). 
  
Bataille maintains that “[m]an’s activity is basically conditioned by this general movement of 
life. In a sense, in extension, his activity opens up a new possibility to life, a new space” (35–
6).  In that life is always a form of life, for humans, at least, it always takes place in a 
community, in the sense at least that it involves always an outside of norms, meanings, rules, 
and institutions, organized in a net or web, expressing the context of development and 
continuance and also the interconnectedness between things. Although, in this sense, modes 
of articulation within any determinate historical terrain are patterned, and maintain their 
regularity, they are also capable of infinite variety and expression. 
 
Life, then, is reproduced and transformed by practices linked by norms of continuance. In 
addition to Nietzsche and Baitaille, Hume is an important influence here. For Hume, 
continuance (or continuous existence, or continuity) is an external relation not given in 
experience of either the senses or understanding.  It is the horizon that all of life presupposes.  
It is achieved through the association of ideas and through impressions ‘torn from the senses’ 
and made possible in terms of a ‘schematizing immagination’ (Deleuze, 1991: 80-81).  As 
Hume says in the Treatise, we “advance rather than retard our existence” (1978: 432).  
Association operates “secretly and calmly on the mind” (334).  Reason is the “slave of the 
passions” (415) and operates on the basis of fancy, ideology and good sense as we set about 
the tasks of living.  In this sense, Hume saw the subject in terms of succession.  This 
highlights for him the importance of habit and anticipation.   The imagination coordinates 
how to live in a process of moving from present to future.  As Deleuze (1991: 92-93) says of 
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Hume, the subject is “a synthesis of the present and the past in the light of the future.”  This 
highlights also the importance of ‘anticipation’, which is “a synthesis of the past and the 
present brought about by habit. Anticipation, or the future, is the synthesis of time constituted 
by the subject” (93). “In short, the synthesis posits the present as the rule for the future” (94). 
Hence, “anticipation is habit, and habit is anticipation: these two determinations—the thrust 
of the past and the élan toward the future—are, at the centre of Hume’s philosophy, the two 
aspects of the same fundamental dynamism.” (92). In Hume’s terms, survival and 
continuance thus constitute relations (of association) between disparate ideas and 
impressions, which are subject to constant reflection and guided by the passions through to 
the imagination.  What underpins such a conception, which Hume articulated in his writings 
on religion, is a concept of purpose. 6 
 
Continuance, then, in my conception, is postulated as the strategic dimension of life. Life 
seeks to continue. It continues in terms of practices. Such practices constitute a good toward 
which societies and humanity aim. A thick conception of life thus entails (1) continuance of 
all life forms, involving both conservation and expenditure of energy; maintenance and 
growth; (2) a conception of survival, or the maintenance of existence; and (3) a conception of 
well-being or flourishing, constitutive of (a) both structures or conditions, (b) capabilities 
which express a positive conception of freedom, and a role for the state, and (c) safety and 
security, indicative of negative rights and protections from interference. The notion of 
continuance does not preclude change, and involves, as it did for John Dewey, various types 
of process, including the intentional and unintentional reproduction of structures and 
practices and various types of learning (from habitual or repetitive, to meaningful or deep).7 
The concern with survival involves a concern to ward off death and continue with ‘bare life’, 
in Agamben’s sense. The conception of well-being includes many possible different factors, 
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which involves individuals with complex practices of self, and an engagement with politics, 
in a quest for the good life. At the macro or institutional level, it involves factors such as a 
problem-solving approach as the basis of education and policy or a conception of security for 
all, incorporating a dimension of negative liberty. Within these conditions, necessary for the 
continuance of life of each and all, there exists the possibility of many different forms of life. 
The quest to sustain life is thus not primarily an instinct, or drive, and must not be interpreted 
naturalistically. Rather, in the sense I mean it, it constitutes a relationship to an environment, 
and a goal, based on a choice, and ultimately, a will.8 It involves beliefs and deliberations, 
guesswork, foresight, knowledge, and anticipation. Because it is at one level a choice, it 
raises the issue of suicide, and one must concede, I believe, a right in this regard.9 The 
continuance of humanity is, we can say, conditional upon the human will to continue. Unlike 
the Darwinian conception, life’s continuance is not conceptualized as a purely individual 
orientation to survival, but must be seen as involving both individual and collective practices. 
Although the modern state is a historically recent entity, forms of collective action, 
governments of one sort or another, are as old as history itself. In that the individual cannot 
even survive today without the collective, both individual and collective increasingly 
presuppose each other. Sustaining and developing life thus expresses a relationship to our 
common humanity, as Bhikhu Parekh (1997) observes. It is because we acknowledge our 
common struggles to survive and prosper that we recognize our common humanity. 
Violations of such values, such as genocide, are typically seen as crimes.10 As such, a 
common concern for survival and the achievement of (well) being goes beyond states, 
classes, races, or gender. It provides a commonality cross-cutting a terrain in terms of which 
manifold differences express themselves.  
 
Establishing Life as a Good 
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If life has immanent within it its own quest for continuance and well-being, expressing itself 
both as strategy and telos, can we say it constitutes both a strategic modus vivendi and a 
substantive conception of good? This I will try at least to argue on the basis that life dictates 
certain shared functions and interests; and also that—increasingly (and therefore 
contingently)—the preconditions for sustaining any life require, more perhaps today than at 
any time hitherto previously in history, the collective coordination of structures, practices, 
and arrangements for all.  
 
Continuing life, then, constitutes both a strategic modus vivendi and a substantive conception 
of good. As a modus vivendi, it functions instrumentally as an accord or settlement. Its 
strategic focus on values like continuance or continuity gives it a pragmatic focus on securing 
settlements over norms between the deeply divergent and pluralistic interests that constitute 
the contemporary world. This was Hobbes’ position in Leviathan. Yet, in the sense that it 
stipulates common aims and requirements, such as stability and security, that allow all to 
survive and flourish, it also posits a good. If it were purely instrumental, then support for the 
values and institutions required would hardly command sufficient common allegiance. Even 
acknowledging the deep pluralism of our contemporary world, the tasks of life’s continuance 
represent shared goals, and for most are important in promoting the good life. But, in this 
sense, such a good is not convergent, meaning it does not seek integration or unity, except 
within broad limits. Although all want to survive, and achieve well-being, the reasons, 
values, motives, and interests may be very different in different groups and individuals. By 
positing such a good, it enables collective responsibilities to be taken seriously, and yet, as 
we shall see, pluralism to be maintained and for the claims of individuals to be arbitrated or 
balanced with the democratic majority. Difference is maintained in relation to the tasks of 
sustaining life in that although all share a will to prosper and flourish, all inhabit social 
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networks and communal solidarities discursively differentiated in relation to space and time. 
Such embodied modalities constitute different styles of life, values, beliefs, aspirations, and 
anticipations of the future. Sustaining life establishes necessary and legitimate boundaries to 
such commitments as liberty and toleration, and yet it is non-metaphysical in that it does not 
posit “a domain beyond discursive verification to which truth and falsity do not apply and 
about which no assertion may meaningfully be made” (Richardson, 1990: 7). In other words, 
it grounds certain commonalities in a chosen or willed order of being, from which certain 
normative principles follow. No super-sensible entities are posited. No assumptions are made 
about the nature of the individual, or the nature of reason beyond that individuals are learning 
beings, and to the extent they have a will to survive and maintain (well)being. The conditions 
it specifies are conditions within history. These conditions will reflect age-old concerns and 
needs, such as the need for sustenance, and yet manifest an inescapable contingency in the 
way that different groups and individuals, at different times and places, are orientated to the 
real conditions of their existence. 
  
Not only is life not metaphysical in the way that offends liberals, but the commonalities 
specified do not preclude pluralism except within certain obvious necessary limits. This is to 
say, what such a good does is specify certain intelligible limits to pluralism. What it does not 
do is specify the detail, or claim to resolve arguments in any complete way as to how 
disputes over such value differences as abortion or affirmative action or euthanasia should be 
resolved. It constitutes a good that will in this sense underdetermine outcomes on specific 
issues. In this sense, it does not resolve the issue of the incommensurability of values in some 
domains (religion, abortion, appropriate punishments), but specifies a formula for arbitrating 
disputes and conflicts, and allows and makes possible for convergences in other areas. In this 
sense, a philosophy of life specifies a range of values and interpersonal standards that will be 
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common to all participants, no matter how intractable the disputes they may otherwise be 
engaged in, and by which disputes can be arbitrated. In this sense, survival and life constitute 
values that have a high priority: higher than other values, such as impulsive desires. To 
resolve disputes in this way indicates a form of rationality in terms of what enhances life.  
Sometimes, where this is not obvious, value disputes will need to be resolved on pragmatic or 
instrumental grounds.11  
  
To continue life forces concordance over the necessary, for if we are to continue, it leaves the 
determination of what is discretionary, and its separation from what is necessary, as 
something for each age to decide. Although a non-metaphysical conception of the good, in 
that it doesn’t presuppose foundational precepts, it doesn’t allow for just anything, but 
specifies particular preferences or prohibitions for specific normative orderings, or rankings. 
The values associated with ‘life’ carry greater importance than do values such as 
‘nationalism’, or ‘sporting achievement’, yet it does not specify all outcomes or determine all 
possibilities. This is because—apart from putting a pro-value on life itself—the concept of 
life does not suggest an easy answer in relation to complex issues such as abortion, 
euthanasia, and the like. It does, however, place the same sort of pro-value on all of human 
life, and in this sense would appear to be broadly egalitarian, as regards moral and political 
status. In this sense, as a good, it is ‘wide’ rather than ‘narrow’, in Richard Arneson’s sense:  
 
The “wider” a perfectionist doctrine, the more it values goods that virtually 
all humans can reach, and the smaller is the gap between the value assigned 
to these lower goods compared to the value assigned to the higher goods that 
few can attain. Wide perfectionism need not be elitist as narrow 
perfectionism is (Arneson, 2000: 55). 
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In a way not dissimilar to Arneson, Richardson (1990) classifies theories of the good in 
relation to their scope.12 Unlike Aristotle, for whom eudeimonia specifies a narrow 
perfectionist scope as the highest good for individuals, or John Rawls, who limits the good to 
the political, the concept of life constitutes a broad scope and a robust conception of the 
good, in the sense that it is not exclusively concerned with rights, but also gives importance 
to responsibilities and duties, as well as in the sense that it is multifaceted and balances 
values such as liberty with those like security. Such rights and duties emerge from the 
common good of continuance. Such a good is objective in the sense that it exists 
independently of individuals and collectivities, but will vary reflecting the specificities and 
imperatives of both time and place and mode of social economic and political organization. 
Such a good, although objective, is itself conditional on the human will to survive, and hence, 
arises - like the Phoenix - once the project of life is underway. Although objective, it is also 
infinitely variable. Just as the tasks of survival vary from culture to culture, so all the forms 
of continuance and flourishing have their cultural and historical specificity. Because it 
manifests a high degree of variability according to time and place, it requires its 
constitutional articulation in relation to the varied domains of human life—sexuality and 
gender relations, work and economy, politics and democracy, rights and liberties—to be 
(re)articulated, (re)expressed and (re)implemented in both national and transnational 
institutional sites on an ongoing basis. It is through these processes of (re)articulation, 
(perpetual) deliberation, and (re)implementation that such a good can be democratically 
mandated, and that, if not strict neutrality, then certainly a conception of ‘justified reasonable 
fairness’ or ‘impartiality’ can be accorded to all participants in the contract based upon their 
different relations to, and interests in, the project called life.  
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As a substantive conception of good, I mean to suggest that the quest to sustain life is 
specific enough to prohibit certain actions and specify limits to a conception to the 
reasonable, and in this sense to function normatively, and yet is broad enough to encompass 
many different lifestyles and value systems. What is good, as Richard Kraut (2007) states, “is 
always for something.” It is what enables something to survive, to prosper, to flourish, to 
continue to live. Just as things may be good for life, so things may be bad for life, or 
indifferent for life. A list of these three categories—of goods, bads, and indifferents—would 
specify what governments ought to encourage; what ought to be outlawed, or discouraged; 
and what ought to be left to the discretion of individuals and communities free from the 
constraints of the state.13  
  
The good in this sense is not as the utilitarian philosophers conceived it, as related to 
preferences and desires. Preferences and desires can be distorted by oppressive social 
conditions, warped by tradition, or may be dysfunctional for life, and has tended historically  
to limit the focus of concern to humans rather than all forms of life14. This is also why the 
utilitarian good of pleasure, although certainly a good under many circumstances, is not 
necessarily a good for life’s continuance in all times and places. We could say that there is 
more to life than individual pleasure or utility. Even the quest of bare life, or basic survival, 
although projected onto the world by life itself, and in this sense constructed, constitutes an 
objective framework of value for all species, and for life itself. The concept of ‘objective’ 
used here is not intended to deny social relativity, or historical variability, nor that different 
amounts of resources may need to be provided due to different initial conditions. Objective in 
this sense is also not referring to any metaphysical reality. This is to say that it is not there in 
the world independent or irrespective of humans; rather its objectivity is dependent and 
conditional upon a will to survive. This will to survive must be exercised both individually 
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and collectively. The good is what is objectively necessary if we are to survive. This is to say 
that, if we are to survive, either as individuals or as a species, then certain objective things 
will follow. Collectively, this will include certain moral, political, and social structures, and 
so on; individually, it will include appropriate nurturance, education, skills, and training. 
Thus, if we want to survive then certain moral categories and certain institutions would best 
be established. This is the constructivism as regards to value and practice that informs my 
approach. 
  
Continuing life is objective, then, in the sense that values and standards and rules will be 
independent of an individual’s own choices and judgments. This is the sense by which, to use 
Thomas Scanlon’s (1975: 658) conception, it posits “a criterion which provides a basis for 
appraisal of a person’s well-being which is independent of that person’s tastes and interests, 
thus allowing for the possibility that such an appraisal could be correct even though it 
conflicted with the preferences of the individual in question.” Scanlon’s approach thus seeks 
to combat the subjectivist approach based on preferences and desires as well as the classical 
liberal approach based on rights. As he summarizes his position: “What I take to be central to 
the objectivist position…is the idea that, insofar as we are concerned with moral claims that 
some interests should be favored at the expense of others in the design of distributive 
institutions or in the allocation of other rights and prerogatives, it is an objective evaluation 
of the importance of these interests, and not merely the strength of the subjective preferences 
they represent, that is relevant” (Scanlon, 1975: 658). 
  
As a consequence of globalization, and also events like 9/11, the importance of this sort of 
objectivism has increased. This is no more evident than in international law, where, as the 
former president of the International Court of Justice has maintained, “the resolutely 
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positivist, voluntarist approach of international law still current at the beginning of the 
[twentieth] century has been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a law 
more readily seeking to reflect a collective juridical conscience and respond to the social 
necessities of States organized as a community.”15 While recognition of the importance of 
objective values has increased, there is a very real sense in which sociologists have always 
recognized their centrality as dimension to life, in relation to defining inhibitions and 
sanctions, both in public and in private. We all do act in publicly agreed upon ways, and both 
our social and our moral behaviors are measured in relation to socially negotiated norms, 
which we contradict at our peril.  
   
In a way not dissimilar to Scanlon, Richard Arneson (2000) also defends an objective theory 
of good. For Arneson (38), an objective, or perfectionist, doctrine of the good “holds that 
what is good for its own sake for a person is fixed independently of her attitudes and opinions 
toward it,” whereas in the subjective good account, “things that are intrinsically good for an 
agent…acquire this status only in virtue of how she happens to regard them” (37). For 
Arneson, it should not be ruled out that perfectionism, in certain cases, might possibly be 
able to justify paternalism. Restriction of choice in certain senses may also be necessary to 
justify choice in others. Rather than perfectionism being thought of as forcing upon the agent 
“a single option thought to be good,” it could more plausibly be seen as prohibiting “some 
tempting bad options while leaving many other options open” (Arneson, 2000: 44). For 
Arneson, then, arguments on conceptual grounds against a “perfectionist-inspired 
paternalism” do not succeed. John Stuart Mill’s view that “strict no-paternalism does best to 
maximize the sum of human good…predictably tends to diminish the welfare of some agents 
who are poor choosers.” One might add that it is not simply ‘poor choosers’, but ‘the 
impressionable’, ‘the younger’, ‘the less experienced’, ‘the elderly’ ‘the unfortunate’, or 
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‘generally less capable’, who conceivably would be most protected from such policies. 
Arneson concludes that “in principle coercive state interference with individuals’ personal 
lives for their own good might be warranted, if it boosts the coerced individual’s achievement 
of perfection and is part of an overall best strategy for maximizing the appropriately 
weighted sum of perfection” (46). Liberals traditionally, as he concedes, will be suspicious of 
increasing state intervention and will have reasons for “doubting that such paternalistic 
interference will very often do more good than harm” (46). This is because, as Arneson puts 
it, “[t]he perfectionist propounds her doctrine in the shadow cast by Plato and Nietzsche” 
(52), not to mention, relatedly, many years of exposure to the liberal theory of totalitarianism. 
He recommends what he terms “a partial solution” which resonates closely with those like 
me who advocate constitutional approaches to global politics, based on the qualities of 
specification, articulation, and institutionalization. A ‘partial solution’, for Arneson, involves 
a response that: 
 
begins by distinguishing a life that is good [objectively]…and a life that is 
good for the person who is living it. The theory of objective human good 
should deliver an account of what constitutes a life that is good for the 
person who lives it.… Once one distinguishes a good life and a life that is 
good for the one living it, it becomes immediately plausible to maintain that 
even if great accomplishment is one dimension of the human good or well-
being, there are other important dimensions that are objectively important 
constituents of it. These other components include having relations of love 
and friendship, having experiences that are interesting and pleasant, 
fulfilling one’s important reasonable life aims or at least a subset of them, 
having a rudimentary understanding of the world one inhabits including its 
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people, having ordinary bodily vigor and good health, and the sustaining of 
all of the above through a life whose span contains more rather than fewer 
years. (52–3)  
 
Rawls’s approach is inadequate precisely because he lacks a theory of the good. We clearly 
need a conception of the good that does not constitute a unified all-encompassing doctrine of 
the good in the way Rawls configured it. Although, for Rawls, “the two main concepts of 
ethics are those of the right and the good” (1971: 21), for him the right is prior to the good. 
He believes that there is a category of reasons that is more important than those that attach to 
good, and that moral decisions can be justified according to self-legislation based purely 
upon a reformulation of Kant’s categorical imperative. Central to Rawls’s individualist 
conception is that such a good is unified, or homogeneous, and that it excludes, 
proportionately to its degree of extension, as a matter of logic and history, the ability of the 
individual to exercise choice or agency. Rawls has classified the problem in terms of the 
concept of ‘perfectionism’ (1971: 286). Whereas utilitarianism is a ‘want-regarding 
principle’, perfectionism is an ‘ideal-regarding principle’ (1971: 287). A perfectionist 
principle “must provide some way of ranking different kinds of achievements and summing 
their values” (1971: 287). Although such a conception need not, he says, provide a very 
accurate assessment, “it should be accurate enough to guide the main decisions concerning 
the basic structure [of society]” (1971: 287). 
  
Rawls’s understanding of good is not the way I understand the concept. For Rawls, the 
conception of perfection not only suggests that any promulgation of a good can only be 
concerned with an impossibly narrow ideal of achievement, but his very understanding of the 
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concept of good resonates with a concern with ‘maximization’ in very much the same way as 
the utilitarians conceived it. As Richard Kraut (2007: 254) notes:  
 
The utilitarian assumes that good is to be maximized, and that it consists in 
the satisfaction of rational desire; both ideas should be rejected. Rawls 
mistakenly agrees that the good consists in the satisfaction of rational desire; 
he holds, again mistakenly, that there is a general category of reasons that 
take precedence over those that avert to good. We should reject both the 
good-maximizing and right-prioritizing alternatives.… Practical reasoning 
must always proceed by way of premises that have to do with what is 
good…but good must be understood developmentally. 
  
My only qualification to Kraut’s wonderfully clear exposition is that the good should be 
understood, not developmentally, but constructively. Rather than see the good as the 
outcome, unfolding, or development of nature, as if caught in the evolving web of 
Aristotelian teleology, we must see it as constructed and as conditional upon our will to 
survive, in a way that is not naturalistic. Will must be seen as stronger than nature; or as 
surpassing nature in this important sense. 
 
Although Rawls takes the concept of perfectionism to stand for any comprehensive 
conception of good, and sees it as synonymous, we could envisage a situation where the good 
in question promoted only a level of sustainability, rather than perfection, or where 
perfection is defined as referring simply to a structure comprising positive values, or a 
threshold, rather than as an ultimate point or value in a hierarchy. In this sense, the 
‘maximizing’ thrust of utilitarianism is avoided. As Kraut (2007: 42) notes, “The maximizing 
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thrust of utilitarianism drives it ever outward, to exclude nothing from its concern that can 
contribute to the total amount of good. That is the result of its fundamental commitment to 
quantitative thinking: the larger the sum total of good that exists, the better the state of the 
universe.” 
  
Certainly if we take a value like ‘excellence’, which Nietzsche is meant to have proffered, 
then the argument is well set up for Rawls to win it. This was certainly Rawls’s 
characterization of Nietzsche. Such a conception promotes elitism, says Rawls, and certainly 
it would. But if Nietzsche is seen as advocating, not ‘excellence for a few’, but ‘life for all’, 
what then? If Zarathustra’s crossing the bridge is not to advance the elite of superman, but to 
construct new norms for the survival of humanity, how should this be represented? While 
Anglo-American scholars have systematically characterized Nietzsche as being elitist, and 
fascist, it is interesting that a whole group of continental thinkers, including those who 
identified with the ‘new’ Nietzsche, dispute the evidence for such a view.16  
  
What is distinctive about the notion of life, of the strategies by which life is continued, is 
that, as a form of the good, its derivation is solely within history, its content alters in many 
respects in different societies and at different times, and it leaves a large degree of latitude as 
to what that content is at any particular time.  There are in this sense certain distinct and 
identifiable limits as to which values and practices should be allowed and which should not. 
Life not only manifests multiplicities as a consequence of time and place, it also permits of a 
multiplicity of specifications, trajectories, and styles in relation to its form. If norms of life as 
a strategy are articulated they are specific to a particular historical terrain. While, of course, 
there are certain constancies as to what it takes to sustain life, or maintain bare survival in all 
periods, neither the tasks of life, nor those of bare survival, can provide a court of 
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transcendental truth that can dictate for the present what should hold for all time. Rather, 
what sustains and promotes life will be relative to a particular horizon. Such a contingency 
goes very deep.17 For Leibniz, as Deleuze (1993) reads him, we can say that life and the tasks 
of surviving it, are always folded differently. The concept of the fold expresses the 
multiplicity of life’s challenges as infinitely complex, and “a conception of matter as multiple 
and continuous. In short it is the triumph of the wave over the particle” (Marks, 1998: 76). 
Just as the tasks of survival vary from one era to another, and even within a particular 
horizon, the perspectivism entailed does not mean truth is relative to its social conditions, 
“but rather constitutes a ‘truth of the relative’” (Marks, 1998: 76).18 Where life establishes 
new limits in relation to the biosphere, it has new global consequences. Decisions for 
economics, politics, or education require constantly adjusted settlements constitutive of 
temporary closures around norms, which must be always open to doubt and questioning if 
they are to sustain a democratic polity.  
  
Although, at one level, a focus on the strategic aspects of life, such as survival and 
continuance, generates a form of consequentialism, unlike utilitarianism it does not privilege 
aggregate or averages, nor does it exclude certain groups or individuals, nor does it privilege 
certain values, like happiness, at the expense of others, like well-being, security, or 
continuity. In this sense, by emphasizing both consequences and harm, it avoids the criticism 
frequently made against Utilitarianism. As Kraut (2007: 43) puts it:  
 
Utilitarianism is committed to a regime of constant sacrifice—sacrificing 
some for the sake of others—in order to increase the quantity of good. And 
the wider our circle of concern becomes—the more beings there are for 
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whom some things are good and others bad—the greater must be our 
readiness to diminish the well-being of some. 
  
In addition, it is not narrowly consequentialist in that morality need not be conceptualized 
purely in terms of outcomes in the manner of the utilitarian. For my own conception is 
committed to both harm as well as consequences. As a relation to the real, or qualitative 
mode of being, life’s quest to continue is deeply interiorized as it is willed and can thus be 
represented as intrinsically worthwhile. As the quest to continue life and achieve (well)being 
is immanent within life, to trade life against life goes against the principle of life itself.19 It is 
on this basis that Bataille considered life as sacred.20 Sacred does not pertain in his sense to 
an objective religious truth, but simply expresses a sense of ‘utmost value’.21  
  
In addition, rights are not be neglected in a life philosophy approach. As liberty and a certain 
amount of property are necessary to continuance, rights are one mechanism for safeguarding 
entitlements in the complex interactions between part and whole, and in reconciling the 
individual and collective. But rights, like responsibilities, must be articulated in each age and 
arise, not from nature, but as necessary as a consequence of a commitment to democratic 
proceduralism, which is justified in this account as crucial to continuance in the coming age.  
      
Establishing Life as a Bad: The Organization of Life by Biopower 
I have argued above that a philosophy of life can serve our purposes for establishing a 
conception of good. Life has immanent powers that are to survive and flourish. A philosophy 
of life can also enable us to criticize the practices of other communities. Hence, it can save 
political theory from localism, patriotism, and nationalism, and solve the problem of moral 
and epistemological relativism, for which writers like Michael Walzer have been criticized. 
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This is to say that life continuance expresses real necessities and immanent qualities which 
characterize all communities, indeed which characterize humanity, and indeed, life itself. It is 
in this sense that life necessities, such as sustenance, are universal in all times and places. 
What communities do is organize life’s immanent tendencies in distinctive ways at the 
discursive level of cultural and linguistic practice. It is this distinction between the discursive 
and the pre-discursive that enables us to avoid relativism and localism. While a community 
constitutes a configuration that is always unique, and where even problems of translation 
from one community to another will always exist, inter-cultural criticism is possible in 
relation to the immanent tendencies that are universally recognizable as part of the forces of 
life itself.22  
 
Figure 1: Dualistic ontology of discursive and pre-discursive 
  
Discursive 
                                                            
(Language, discourse, culture, practices, states of affairs) 
Configurations depend on time and place (therefore, infinite possibilities of configurative 
form) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Pre-discursive   
                                  
Life/non-life necessities                                  Labour 
(Non-Discursive materialities: facts, things, regularities – e.g., birth, death – finite 
regularities, technologies, etc.) 
 
 
This distinction between discursive and pre-discursive, as schematically represented in 
Figure 1, permits the elaboration of a dualistic ontology and is familiar in writers like 
Foucault and Adorno and others with the general orbit of neo-Kantianism, including Marx 
and Marxism.  Central to both Foucault and Adorno was an impossibility of avoiding 
conceptual mediation and a refusal to accept that objectivity could be achieved through the 
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application of universally valid laws of reason.  Both also rejected other familiar attempts to 
posit objectivity, and thus solve Kant’s paradox, including Bergson’s appeal to 
‘intuitionism’, Husserl’s phenomenological reduction via ‘intentionality’, or via the ‘protocol 
sentences’ of positivism.  There could be no knowledge except through reflexiveness and 
mediation. Although Foucault, at least in a formal sense, left the issue unresolved, for 
Adorno, all that grounded a limited conception of objectivity was life itself, or rather, the 
experience of life.  In this sense, too, the positing of life necessities as historical represents a 
commitment for we can only know them indirectly via mediation.  As Alastair Morgan 
(2007) notes, it was the impossibility of escaping conceptual mediation that characterizes 
Adorno’s solution to Kant’s paradox in reinstating life experience as the indirect route by 
which the real is apprehended and understood.  As Morgan argues, such a concept of life 
enables Adorno to construct a normative theory which permits him to delineate the contours 
of a ‘damaged life’, as exemplified by Auschwitz, and to postulate more fundamentally 
enriched modes of living, without – hopefully – presuming an essential, ahistorical way of 
life that in some sense constitutes a ‘natural way of living.’   
 
A philosophy of life can also help us understand life as a bad, by which I mean it can provide 
us with materialist categories whereby we understand violence, deceit, fraud, war, genocide, 
murder, and exclusion. In this section I want to consider Foucault’s account of racism and the 
collusion of sovereign and biopower, which culminated in Nazism. If power can organize life 
for good, it can also do so for bad. It is this latter prospect we now seek to understand.  
   
For Foucault, it is around life that power organizes itself, the importance of life and death 
being a dysemmetrical in different systems of power. In the History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 
the transition of power from the Middle Ages to modernism alters the way life is focused 
 29 
upon. Prior to the seventeenth century, life was focused upon in terms of death, or the right to 
end it, which was the prerogative of the Sovereign. The Sovereign “exercised his power over 
life only by exercising his right to kill,” or by refraining from killing: “He evidenced his 
power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring” (1978: 136). “The right 
which was formulated as the ‘power of life and death’ was in reality the right to take life or 
let live. Its symbol, after all, was the sword” (136). Power in this sense was juridical in that 
“power was exercised mainly as a means of destruction (prélèvement)” or as a “subtraction 
mechanism” (136).  
  
Early modernism witnessed the rise of new forms of power over life—related to 
administrating it, and enabling it, in a more productive sense. This was crucially a form of 
positive power in that, rather than controlling it according to the simple axis of destroying it, 
or letting it be, it sought to constrain or alter forms of life as given in order to shape the ends 
and purposes desired; to improve it, to make it better, to foster it. The modern era witnessed 
two forms of such positive power—first, disciplinary power, centered on the body as a 
machine, aiming to integrate it into a specific system of control. Although such a system was 
exemplified by Foucault in relation to the prison, as a technology it could be applied to 
different settings. A second form of positive power that complimented sovereign power after 
modernism, Foucault called biopower. This form focused on man as a global mass, species, 
or population and concerned such phenomena as propagation, birth, mortality, health, and life 
expectation. Rather than being primarily juridical, centered on law as prohibition or 
destruction, its legal orientation was regulatory, its political vision teleological, and its 
epistemology constructivist. Biopower became especially important from the second half of 
the eighteenth century with the rise of demography, utilizing statistical knowledge, enabling 
new forms of control and new types of interventions, and enabling the individual to be 
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compared on the same conceptual space to others and to the population. New types of 
knowledge, such as political arithmetic, statistics, and eugenics, led to new knowledge of 
aggregates and wholes, which gave rise to concepts such as ‘population’ and new 
developments in relation to ‘insurance’, ‘planning’, and ‘interventions’ in relation to health, 
childcare, and the administration of welfare and security. Biopower thus operates at a more 
general level than disciplinary mechanisms and results in a more general form of knowledge. 
Its mode of operation is regulatory and it enables security as a discipline which aims to 
optimize life and protect it from dangers—both internal and external—by regulating them 
and rendering them secure. Both biopower and discipline constitute new positive forms of 
power whose focus is regulatory and broadly pedagogical rather than juridical, and focus on 
optimization rather than mere policing through control over death. Regulatory law relies on a 
knowledge of contexts, populations, and needs, as opposed to the formal nature of the 
juridical subject whose relation to others and characteristics as part of a population were not 
known, indeed, could not be known, prior to the modern era. These new forms of knowledge, 
together with the rise of capitalism and consequent urbanization and industrialization, thus 
constitute the material basis of these new positive forms of power, in the sense that they make 
them possible. Although, to a large extent, disciplinary and biopower were harnessed as 
technologies by the state, they were also utilized, increasingly, through society in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by all manner of groups and organizations: religious, 
social, political, and charitable. Such an emergent form of power, which Foucault sees as 
materially grounded in the changes of the early modern period, linked to the rise of 
capitalism, the emergence of new conceptions of science, and the developments in 
philosophy related to the rise of liberalism. Biopower introduces new mechanisms of power 
such as forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures. It ushered in the importance and 
rise of the norm at the expense of the juridical system of law (1978: 144). Although norms, 
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for Foucault, constitute standards around an average, they are themselves based on the 
immanent capabilities of life. Hence, Foucault says: “The ‘right to life’, to one’s body, to 
health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and beyond all the oppressions or 
‘alienations’, the ‘right’ to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this ‘right’—which 
the classical juridical system was utterly incapable of comprehending—was the political 
response to all these new procedures of power which did not derive, either, from the 
traditional right of sovereignty” (1978: 145). 
   
Foucault thus contrasts the negativity of sovereign power with a positive power over life that 
parallels the classical liberal mindset of the seventeenth century as constituting the condition 
for the rise of capitalism and new forms of political order. The forms of power that the liberal 
philosophers later identified as dangerous were materially inscribed in the social conditions 
of modernity emerging from the seventeenth century. The model for sovereign power, he 
says (2003: 265), “is a subject of natural rights or primitive powers” and it encapsulates a 
negative power over death, while biopower parallels the emergence of positive forms of 
power of the era of social democratic state of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
emergence of such power introduces dangers in relation to the abuse of power by the state. 
This is what Foucault meant when he said that biopower inscribes racism in the mechanisms 
of the state, in dividing the species into sub-species based on race and introducing a new 
logic into the operation of the state—new enemies identified as threats to the population 
(Jews, communists, terrorists, Muslims) establishing killing as (once more) acceptable on 
certain conditions, as one sub-species becomes ‘other’, establishing a new logic of war, 
signaling a destructive moment in biopower. Foucault asks: 
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What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the 
domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live 
and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum of a 
human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the 
fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are 
described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological 
that power controls. It is away of separating out the groups that exist within a 
population. (2003: 254) 
 
Hence, the first function of racism is to fragment. It enables power to “subdivide the species 
it controls, into subspecies known, precisely as races” (2003: 255). Racism thus refers to the 
“caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower” (255). Racism’s second 
function allows the establishment of a positive relation of the type: “The very fact that you let 
more die will allow you to live more” (255). This establishes the view: “if you want to live, 
you must take more lives” (255). Such a relationship was not invented by the modern state, 
but is essentially a relationship of war (255) for “in order to live, you must destroy your 
enemies” (255). Racism thus trades on a “biological-type relationship” (255). “The more 
inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates 
there will be in the species as a whole” (255). Killing others, says Foucault, will make “life in 
general healthier: healthier and happier” (255). Biopower thus allows differentiation based on 
threats of biology and endeavors to eliminate threats in order to improve the species.  
  
In this sense, life justifies not only an ethics of continuance, but a justification for war, 
fragmentation, murder and killing, expulsion and rejection. Under the biopower mode, what 
Foucault calls racism develops as an ever-present possibility. Foucault articulates how war 
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has been used as a way of enhancing one’s own life at the expense of inferior others, or 
impure races. War has been biopower’s strategy of protecting against others, of purifying and 
correcting anomalies. For Foucault, “racism justifies the death-function in the economy of 
biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically 
stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population, insofar as one is an element in a 
unitary living plurality” (2003: 258). 
  
Racism thus becomes the way the state, in the age of biopower, exercises sovereign power. 
Foucault takes the example of Nazism to show why “the most murderous states are also of 
necessity, the most racist” (258). Nazism was “the paroxysmal development of the new 
power mechanisms that had been established since the eighteenth century.… Controlling the 
random element inherent in biological process was one way of the regime’s immediate 
objectives” (259).  
  
Racism is thus the way that the old sovereign right to take life is re-introduced under the era 
of biopower. With Nazism one gets the absolute coexistence of biopower and the sovereign 
right to kill (260). “Nazism alone took the play between the sovereign right to kill and the 
mechanisms of biopower to this paroxysmal point.… But this play is in fact inscribed in the 
workings of all States. In all modern States, in all capitalist States? Perhaps not. But I do 
think that—but this would be a whole new argument—the socialist State, socialism, is as 
marked by racism as the workings of the modern State, of the capitalist State.… Socialism 
was a racism from the outset, even in the nineteenth century” (2003: 261).  
  
As to why Nazism arose at a particular juxtaposition of sovereign and biopower, Foucault 
seems not to be sure as to what precisely accounted for such aberrant tendencies: “The 
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coexistence in political structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions orientated 
to the care of individual life is somewhat puzzling. It is this rationality, and the death and life 
game which takes place in it, that I’d like to investigate from an historical point of view” 
(Foucault, 1988: 147–48). It cannot, however, be explained, as liberals are wont to do, as a 
consequence of the ‘positive’ power of the state, nor as Max Weber, Walter Benjamin, 
several of the Frankfurt School, or more recently, Zygmund Bauman, would have us believe, 
solely on the basis of bureaucratic rationalization, or instrumental rationality. For while the 
specificity for the explanation for totalitarianism, or state violence, escapes any such single 
cause or answer, what is needed is a minute and detailed historical analysis that contemplates 
the full complexity of the mix of factors in their historical emergence. What Foucault invokes 
is a theory of affects, or combinations. As Mitchell Dean explains it: “It is not merely the 
succession or addition of the modern powers over life to the ancient right of death but their 
very combination within modern states that is of significance. How these powers are 
combined accounts for whether they are malign or benign” (2004: 20). 
  
Hence, it is “the different ways in which bio-politics is combined with sovereign power [that] 
decide their character” (20). In relation to Nazism, says Dean, it is “the system of linkages, 
re-codings and re-inscriptions of sovereign notions of fatherland, territory, and blood with the 
new bio-political discourse of eugenics and racial hygiene that makes the unthinkable 
thinkable” (20).  The possibility of such monstrous juxtapositions is always present. For 
Foucault identifies “governmentality which characterizes modernity as involving both 
sovereignty and biopower as ‘the intersection of two processes’—a way of managing the 
population using both poles” (Foucault, 1991: 18–19). Traditionally, as Dean notes also, 
liberalism has sought to apply preventative techniques of government through two 
mechanisms: the idea of a self-regulating market order which in turn justifies a restriction on 
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the scope and size of the state, and the discourse of rights, emerging from the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.23 If the market order is self-regulating, and nature also constitutes a 
‘spontaneous’ order which was ‘integrative’ and ‘self-correcting’, then the state could 
operate as an ‘umpire’, or ‘Night Watchman’ as liberals from Adam Smith to Robert Nozick 
have variously expressed it. In addition to the theories of ‘laissez-faire’, and the self-
regulating market, the discourse of natural rights, and natural law, as developed by Locke, 
specifying ‘life, liberty and property’ as God-given rights, and which no government could 
dislodge without jeopardizing its right to govern, and legitimating revolt by the citizenry. 
Foucault, says Dean (2004: 21), is open to the possibilities of a “virtuous combination” and 
he ‘puzzles’ at the possibilities of various ‘pathological’ or ‘virtuous’ mixes.  
 
Conclusion 
In terms of constructing a future in the horizon that presents itself today, then, what prospects 
does positive power contain for peace and security that excludes or contains the potentials for 
war and fragmentation? The question is: how can positive power be rendered safe? The only 
answer is, I believe, a global democracy that incorporates norms for solidarity and equality 
and global justice and is based on a balance of power implemented at the global level, as well 
as new global norms of accountability and transparency.  Unless people consider themselves 
fairly and appropriately treated, the compact for life continuance will break down.  That there 
are prospects, in the current horizon for state racism and pathological insurgencies cannot be 
denied. As Paul Hirst (2001, 2002, 2005) points out, the future squeeze on global resources 
and instabilities associated with climate change, global poverty, and terrorism, create distinct 
prospects of increased military conflict and war, as states compete for increasingly scarce 
resources.  The future, then, is at best uncertain. 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 This chapter draws from Chapter 6 of Toward A Global Thin Community, published 
by Paradigm Publishers in 2009, and I would like to thank the publishers for 
reproducing segments here. 
 
2
 I am indebted to Morgan (2007) for originally drawing my attention to 
Scnädelbach’s work. 
 
3
 This is perhaps why, he says, the issue of anomaly “permeates the whole of biology” 
(1998: 476). 
4
 Agamben seems to conflate a distinction between the one and the many (individual 
and collective) with a distinction between nature and culture. As such, he essentializes 
sovereignty and presumes a naturalization of bare life as being prior to the social, 
because sovereignty always dominates biopower. As he says in Homo Sacer, for 
instance, “The entire character of homo sacer shows that it was not born on the soil of 
a constituted juridical order but goes all the way back to the period of pre-social life” 
(104). Or, again, he relates ‘bare life’ to “a fragment of the primitive life of Indo-
European people” (104). He maintains further that the “Hobbesian state of nature 
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is…a condition in which everyone is bare life and homo sacer for everyone else” 
(106). For him, thus, homo sacer has a “pre-legal” quality (106). The distinction can 
only be valid, for Foucault, as indicating a tension, or continuum, between the one and 
the many. Foucault does not essentialize sovereignty, and is thus more optimistic 
about the future than Agamben, as sovereignty does not necessarily stand outside the 
law, or on the borderline between law and exception, but is capable of being 
democratized, or controlled. 
5
 Deleuze documents the criticisms that Bergson encountered as being against his 
rejection of eternal or foundational values. (See Marks, 1998: 68) 
6
 See Hume (1970) and Deleuze (1991: 109) 
 
7
 Although Dewey’s writings on continuity are insightful, his concept of growth 
betrays a Hegelian influence which is rejected in my conception. Growth for Dewey 
indicates continued progress and an inevitable direction to history as characterized by 
improvement. The notion also suggests a dialectical process of the reconciliation of 
contradictions through successive syntheses. Continuance in my conception is simply 
saying that the quest to continue is immanent within life. 
8
 Even if it is an instinct, it can be overridden by an act of choice, as in suicide. It is 
conceptualized here as both a relation to an environment and as a goal. 
9
 There is no need to deny that life might initially ‘decide’ on itself biogenetically, 
given sustainable ecological and environmental conditions, and that there may be 
‘instincts’ that ‘facilitate’ transition to life. But, ultimately, life continues confirmed 
by a choice, if not actively, then by default. The active potential of life should not be 
denied or neglected. 
10
 This need not be justified according to something called nature, or natural law, but, 
rather on the basis that, within finitude and the limitations that that imposes, no 
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overriding evidence can support why any group or individual who wills survival 
should be excluded. The reader may accuse me of playing with words. The point 
however, is that to say that life has a quest for continuance immanent within it is not 
necessary to invoke nature. The pro-value on life is itself the vote of life. Who shall 
demur? 
11
 Continuance in this context asserts that it is preferable to achieve a settlement for 
the purposes of ‘continuing’, when conflict threatens life itself, rather than to fight 
endlessly over incommensurable value positions.  
12
 Richardson (1990) distinguishes theories of the good in relation to (1) metaphysical 
depth, detailing the types of foundational postulates it contains; (2) critical structure, 
pertaining to what enables it to prohibit or support a certain normative ordering; (3) 
scope, pertaining to the range of subject matter to which it applies, and whether it is 
narrow or broad; and (4) degree of detail of the conception, pertaining to whether it 
stipulates a few general principles, or sub-principles, and the degree of detail it 
requires to be specified in relation to them. This framework has guided me to some 
extent in the considerations in this section.  
13
 I believe that this typology is more useful and adequate to a global age than Mill’s 
‘harm principle’, for instance. The harm principle depends upon a whole sub-structure 
of assumptions about ‘self-regarding/other-regarding’ behavior, or ‘private/public’ 
spheres, and is of limited use when considering complex issues, such as: “Would 
allowing ‘Faith schools’ to organize and recruit students solely on the grounds of 
religion cause harm to other groups or to a democratic polity as a whole?” to be 
answered. The issue is simply too complex to be considered in such simplistic terms. 
The ‘harm principle’ also permits too greater indeterminacy, and it is noteworthy that 
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Mill himself thought that ‘drug taking’ was an exclusively private affair, which no 
one had any right to interfere over.  
14
 Utilitarians such as Peter Singer have of course sought to make up for this neglect in 
recent years by focusing on animals. 
 
15
 President Bedjaoui, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1996), 226.  
16
 Nietzsche’s position on this has already been touched upon. The difficulty here is 
Rawls viewing the good as always representing an ideal which is perfect, and then, 
after having set the situation up in this way, deciding that it is elitist. The 
counterargument to Rawls is that his detection of elitism, excellence, fascism, etc., in 
the good, is an artifact of the manner in which he constructs his argument. 
17
 Even the neoliberal theory of the self-interested subject, as developed by game 
theorists in America during the 1940s and 1950s, must be seen as contingent, rather 
than, as was supposed, foundational and universal. The game theorists postulated the 
idea that self-interested egoism was always the preferred rational choice, and that 
shared or cooperative behavior was not rational. (Such was the scenario of the classic 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, for instance). But in a situation where life’s limits to the 
biosphere are altered as a consequence of either population pressure, climate change, 
nuclear stalemate, or for any other reason, the boundaries between—and indeed the 
very conceptions of what is—‘self-interest’ versus ‘shared interest’, or ‘public 
interest’, radically alter. In a situation of a nuclear nightmare, for example, my self-
interest becomes identical to yours! (i.e., shared!). Similarly, in a period of climate 
environmental crisis, new shared concerns emerge. Even adopting game theory logic, 
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once intense enough as a threat, the rational choice is to opt for the cooperative, or 
shared strategy.  
18
 Marks is citing Giles Deleuze from What is Philosophy? (see Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994) 
19
 This is as near as one gets to natural rights. But, of course, life’s immanent quest for 
continuance gives only a right to be included—life and liberty—but not property, 
except as is sufficient to continue. 
20
 Spiritual could also allude to values of commonality and connectedness between 
life forms, sensed, but poorly articulated and therefore unable to be expressed, within 
liberal discourses which were atomistic. Also, see Agamben (1998). 
21
 It is rational for the religious person to claim a defense of agnosticism, within the 
bounds of finitude, but not atheism, or absolute definite knowledge. Such a sacred 
attitude, premised on the basis of an insufficiency of knowledge as the ontological 
condition of existence, may conceivably justify arguments, like those of Habermas 
(2003), that the active manipulation of the human genome would confuse or change 
morally important distinctions between life and non-life, the grown and the fabricated. 
Such issues are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
22
 Hence, we can distinguish the cultural form of articulation from the practice of life 
continuance it represents. 
23
 We may of course add to Dean’s list the doctrine of the separation of powers, as 
well as the separation of church from state. 
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